Since 1970 farm exports have increased both in dollar value and as a share of total farm commodity sales, The 1975-76 marketing year was the seventh successive year of record agricultural exports in nominal terms. The $23 billion of farm products exported last year was almost four times file dollar value of farm exports in 1969 and more than double the value of 1972. The nominal value of farm exports rose at a 21 percent annual rate during tile seven-year period since 1969, while in real terms (at constant prices) they rose at a 12 percent rate. The value of such exports rose from 14 percent of farm commodity sales in 1970 to 24 percent in 1976. Furthermore, in 1976 a smaller proportion of the exports was sold on concessional terms (aided by Government subsidies). Concessional sales abroad declined from two percent of total farm commodity sales in 1972 to one percent in 1976.
Farm exports as a percent of farm commodity sales have moved in a U-shaped pattern since W'orJd War I (see accompanying cllart). In the early 1~20ssuch exports exceeded 20 percent of gross farm receipts. By the late 1 9 20s farm exports had declined to 17 percent of sales; they averaged 11 percent of sales during the l930s, 10 percent in the 1940s, and 12 percent in the 1950s. In the l960s exports rose to 15 percent of sales and continued upward in the 1970s, averaging 24 percent of sales in the three calendar years 1974-76 inclusive -almost the same as in the early 1920s.
RE-STRICTIVE WORLD TRADE

PRACTICES
The downturn in farm exports in the 1920s can be largely traced to substantial increases in artificial restrictions on world trade in general. The relatively free trade era beginning in the mid-1800s -trade without high tariffs, quotas, and other government restrictions -was generally on the wane following World War I. In the 1920s there was an observable worldwide trend toward increased international trade restrictions. Britain, a traditionally free trade nation, levied the Key industries Duty in 1921 which imposed a 33.33 percent ad valorern tariff rate on many items. In addition, wartime duties were reimposed on a number of "luxuries" in 1925, after their lapse in 1924. The United States enacted the FordneyMcCumber Tariff in 1924 raising import duties on numerous items. Still higher duties were levied by the United States in 1930 with the passing of the 1-lawleySmoot Act. This Act authorized tariff rate increases on more tllan 800 items during the early stages of the great depression. Ofiler nations immediately retaliated by increasing their import duties.' Within two years general tariff increases were enacted in nine nations which comprised the major world market for U.S. farm products, including Canada, Cuba, Mexico, France, Italy, Spain, India, Argentina, and Brazil.
As a consequence of these trade restrictions and a worldwide depression, which began in 1929, world trade both in nominal terms and relative to GNP declined sharply. From 1929 to 1932, the dollar value of world trade dropped 61 percent, and the value of U.S. foreign trade fell 69 percent.
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declined from 4.9 percent to 2.7 percent of GNP during the period. Farm commodity exports declined from $1.8 billion to $0.75 billion during the three fiscal years ending in 1932. Farm exports as a share of total farm production, however, remained relatively stable during the early depression years despite the higher tariff rates. In 1930, the first full year of the depression, farm exports amounted to 13 percent of farm commodity sales, and at the trough of the depression in 1933 such exports, while declining sharply in nonminal value, still totaled about 13 percent of sales. While attempts were being made to expand international trade through tariff reductions, Congress enacted special legislation in a number ot instances which was designed to expand farm exports through the use of export subsidies. The expansion of farm exports through the use of Government subsidies was a major factor in the post World \Var II assistance to Europe and Japan under the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, the Marshall Plan. and other relief and recovery programs. A fixed portion of the foreign economic aid funds in 1954 was earmarked to buy surplus farm commodities from the United States. Public Law 480, passed in 1954, was specifically designed to provide a foreign outlet for 'surplus" farm products. While these programs were not restrictive within themselves, they tended to produce retaliatory restrictive actions by other Ilations. 
Free International Trade Espoused
Production Controls and Price Supports
In 1933, when tile New Deal came into being direct legislative action was taken to increase farm product prices to levels above those dictated by tile free market. The Agricultural Adjustment Administration was established to curtail production of most major crops. A specific number of acres was allocated to the key crops~n each farm. Price supports were set through Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) nonrecourse loans to farmers on stored commodities. The loan and storage programs, financed at taxpayer expense, were designed to guarantee a specific price, usually above the free market level, to farm procheers by restricting the flow of commodities to both domestic and export markets. The surplus disposal programs -Public Law 480, school lunches, food stamps, and otller food disposal schemes -were all designed to increase total demand for farm products and thereby enhance prices. The Public Law 480 program, wilich subsidized exports of farm commodities to the less developed nations, may have increased farm exports somewhat. 1-lowever, such programs were disruptive of normal trade [lows, and genermdlv have been regarded as "dumping" 'vllen used by otller nations to export products to the United States.
Production controls am~ci price supports have been a 1najor deterrent to the expansion of international trade in farm products over most of the period since tilt' early 1930s. They reduced domestic farm output and led to increased prices for farm products to all users, both domestic and foreign. The average price of U.S. farm products rose at the rate of 15 percent per year from 1932, the last year prior to the programs, to 1935. In comnparison, the average price of industrial commodities rose at a 3.4 percent rate during this period.
Following tile production controls and price supports, U.S. farm commodity exports declined both relative to farm commodity' sales-'dllcl as a share of total U.S~-e~xp()rts. Farm exports, which accounted for 14 percent of farm commodity sales in 1932, dropped to 11 percent of such sales in 1934 following the restrictions, amld continued downward to 8.5 percent in 1936 (see chart). Farm exports averaged 38 percent of total U.S. exports during the eight years prior to the programs . Farm exports declined to an average of 29 percent of total exports from 1934 to 1940 and to 23 percent of total exports from the end of World War II until 1971, despite the government subsidies on a sizable portion of the farm commodities exported.ĩ 'he artificially high fann product prices resulting from the production controls and price supports caused the rest of the world to increase the production of farm products from the amounts that would ilave otherwise been produced. The higher farm product prices increased the returns to resources in agriculture and caused increased resources to move into the industry in the rest of the world. Consequently, farm production outside the United States was enhanced and U.S. farm exports reduced. In addition, increased resources moved into the production of farm commodity substitutes both here and abroad leading to a further reduction in world demand for U.S. farm products.
Cotton
One prime example of the consequences of the U.S. farm production controls and subsidies was the sharp decline in the usage of domestic cotton. In 1930, prior to tile acreage controls and price supports, tins nation supplied more than 50 percent of the worlds cotton production. At the beginning of V 7 orld War II. after seven years of the programs, cotton production in the United States had declined to 40 percent of the world total, and the nation's share continued do\vn to less than 20 percent of the world total in 1970. In 1930 the United States exported 7.1 mnillion bales of cotton, or more than 50 percent of total world cotton exports. By 1940 U.S. cotton exports had decimned to 1.2 million hales or about 15 percent of the world total. The volume of domestic cotton exports rose folloxving World War II, hut in 1970 U.S. exports totaled only 3.7 million hales, or 22 percent of the world total.
The cotton programs han a major impact on world laud resource use as indicated by shifts in tile acreage used for cotton production. i)uring the-1930s cotton harvested in tile United States declined 43 percent, from 42 million to 24 million acres. In contrast, cotton harvested in foreign countries rose 24 percent, from 43 million to 53 mniliiomm acres during the period. In tile 40 years fromn 1930 to 1970, during most of which pro--ftJ,5, Dcparfmoent of Agriculture. Agrieultu,-a/ Statistics, 1972, p. 698,
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duction controls and price supports were in effect, acres of cotton harvested in the United States fell 74 percent, whereas the acreage harvested in the rest of the world rose 57 percent. Although part of the reduction in cotton acreage in the United States reflected rising domestic yields and technological developnlents in the synthetic fiber industry, a large part of tile shift call be attributed to the restrictive cotton programs.
While the impact of the cotton restrictions on the use of synthetic fiber substitutes is difficult to assess. the higher prices for cotton resulting from the restrictions were no doubt a factor contributing to the sharp increase in synthetic fiber usage. At the beginmug of the controls in 1933, synthetic fiber substitutes were virtually unknown. Following W~orldWar II such fibers began to compete aggressively with cotton, and by 1975 the poundage of such fibers used by domestic mills was more than double that of cotton.
Wheat
Cotton is only one examnple of export markets being undermined by domestic farm production restrictions and price supports. The wheat acreage controls and price supports had a similar impact. The Government began to hold wheat off the market in mid-1929 through loans to farmers by the Federal Farm Board. In 1933 domestic acreage controls and the International Wheat Agreement further contributed to rising wheat prices and a reduction in wheat exports. While the downward adjustment in domestic \vheat acreage was not as much as was planned during the early years of the controls, because of the drought in 1933 and 1934, the controls did reduce production, and wheat prices rose. The adjustmnents in resource use in some of the major wheat importing nations -as a result of the higher prices took a predictable route. The largest wheat importer, the United Kingdom, increased its wheat acreage by plowing up some grassland and planting it to wheat. Italy expanded her acreage by clearing and draining the Pontine Marshes. France 
Co-ntrois Relaxed and Exports Rose
In recent years Government controls on agriculture have been relaxed, and greater reliance has been placed on free market forces in the use of farm production resources and the pricing of farm commodities. This action freed about 60 million additional acres for crop production. CCC loans on basic crops have been continued, but the rates have generally been set below world-price levels and subsidies on the production of many farm commodities have been eliminated.
The decline in the impact of the Government pricesupport programs on the price of farm commodities is indicated by the reduced volume of CCC loans and holdings. Tn 1965 the value of farm commodities owned by the CCC totaled $4.1 billion and the corporation had an additional $2.6 billion of loans outstanding on farm commodities through price support operations. By 1974 the value of commodities owned by the CCC had declined to $188 million, and CCC loans outstanding were down to $681 million. The freeing of agriculture from excessive production restrictions and the return to the price mechanism as the major instnlment in managing the farm economy has no doubt been a major factor in the sharp increase in farm exports in recent years.
Other Factors Contr-ibuted to Rising Farm Exports
A rising volume of world trade in recent years has contributed to the sharp increase in U.S. farm exports. Since 1970 exports of the eight major commercial nations listed in Table I have increased faster than their Gross National Product (GNP), and in most cases export growth has more than doubled the rate of GNP growth. In contrast, from 1960 to 1964 exports rose at about the same rate as CNP.
In addition to the relaxation of farm programs which has contributed to rising world trade in recent years, other factors affecting the rising volume of farm exports include: a relatively peaceful international situation, the move to more flexible exchange rates, some further tariff reductions, the OPEC oil cartel, and rising real incomes. For centuries the threat of war and the alleged demands for national defense have been used as arguments for greater self sufficiency. The military strength of a nation is believed by mnany people to he enhanced by self-sufficiency in economic production, particularly food. Consequently, during periods of major threats to world peace and immediately after major international disturbances the proponents of self sufficiency are likely to influ- ence national trading policy, especially in those nations which import a large percent of their food supply. These proponents of self sufficiency hold that it is safer in an uncertain world to provide the basic mlecessities at home even at higher costs. 8
The move to more flexible exchange rates in 1971 probably contributed to the rise in total international trade by the United States and, thereby, to an increase in farm exports. During the late 1960s the dollar was overvalued in international trade -that is, at the fixed exchange rate American produced goods were less attractive in the international market than foreign produced goods. Consequently, foreign purchases of goods and services from the United States declined relative to foreign sales to the United States. However, with the establishment of the floating exchange rates which emerged from the so-called crisis of 1971, the dollar was no longer overvalued relative to other currencies and, as a result, U.S. exports of goods and services rose.
While it is argued by some that flexible exchange rates increase the risks of international trade, others point out that the market pricing of currencies leads to a reduction in trade restrictions. Governments While the higher oil prices following the actions of the OPEC cartel cut two ways in the export picture, they probably contributed to increased U.S. farm exports on balance. U.S. oil purchases from abroad have increased several fold since the cartel was formed, and a larger quantity of farm commodities are required to purchase a given quantity of oil. On the negative side, however, a number of the major importers of U.S. farm commodities, such as Japan and Germany, nosy use a larger portion of their foreign exchange to purchase oil from the OPEC nations.
Apparently these nations will have less foreign exchange to purchase farm products from the United States.
Free Trade -A Boon to Am-c-rican Agriculture
The sharp increase in U.S. exports within the free have more goods available for consumption than would be available without the specialization of production and trading. Our increase in farm exports is thus more than matched by a gain in our ability to purchase goods and services produced by other nations. Conversely, the gain in exports to the United
States by other nations increases their ability to purchase our farm products and provides them ssith more goods for consumption. Consequently, any restrictions which dampen our imports or interfere with international trade in any way reduce the degree of mutually profitable international specialization and thereby restrict the export market for domestic farm products.
External world trade and U.S. farm exports can be expected to increase further as the major economies of the world accept freer trade policies. For trade to continue to expand, however, free trade policies are necessary for both exports and imports. Restrictions on imports of foreign goods and services, farm price supports and production controls, and quotas on exports are not conducive to world trade growth. Nations which follow such arbitrary-trade restricting practices and production controls cause importing nations to lose confidence in them as a source of supply. Importers will thus become more self sufficient or look elsewhere for a more reliable supply for the same reason that the United States hopes to gain greater self sufficiency in petroleum production and usage. If the United States cams avoid such restrictions, our farm exports should continue to expand. Farmers will experience gains from tile expansion. Imports of nonfarm products should increase and somewhat slower growth will occur in the domestic production of those types of products that are imported. However, greater expansion will occur in the farm sector and in the farm supply industries such as fertilizer and farm machinery. I-fence, the rise in specialization
